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Abstract 
The paper addresses the problem of entry barriers for a new technology – hydrogen powered 
cars or cars with fuel cell engines – if the network of its filling stations is missing or thin. We 
use Hotelling’s model of product differentiation to characterize a situation where an 
incumbent firm produces the old technology, compatible with the existing network of filling 
stations, and an entrant, who cannot use this network for its products. We assume that the 
entrant has to invest in remodeling existing filling stations for making them compatible. This, 
however, raises his costs. In the intertemporal setting of our model, the Hotelling pricing rule 
for exhaustible resources encourages the entrant to invest in compatibility because the price of 
gasoline will rise in the long run to the price of the backstop technology - fuel cells. 
Depending on the cost of compatibility, our model indicates three possible outcomes. Either, 
the costs of compatibility are too high and governmental support is required. Or the 
incumbent bears losses in initial periods by waiting for profits in later periods when full 
compatibility of the network is reached. Or the entrant benefits from the fact that the price of 
oil reaches the price of the backstop technology (full cells) rather soon.    
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Network effects, Compatibility and the Environment: 
The Case of Hydrogen Powered Cars1 
 
 
1. Introduction   
According to ambitious plans by the European Union, fossil fuel is supposed to be substituted 
by hydrogen by the end of the year 2100. The dream is a nearly emission free automobile 
which would contribute to achieve a stricter CO2 emission target and would also reduce the 
dependency of Europe from oil imports. The fuel-cell technique which uses the possibility to 
produce electricity and heat by the controlled oxyhydrogen explosion of hydrogen with 
oxygen plays a central role here. Some cities already have electricity driven busses or fuel-cell 
power stations. However, a widespread infrastructure for hydrogen power in Europe is far off 
and would require huge investment costs. This network externality restrains consumers to buy 
hydrogen-powered cars. The consumption externality is generated through an indirect effect 
because an agent, purchasing a car, is concerned about the number of other agents purchasing 
similar cars because the units of the complementary good, hydrogen equipped gas-stations, 
increases with the number of hydrogen powered cars that will be sold. The number of those 
cars being sold will depend on the service network which, in turn, will increase if more cars 
have been sold. Network externalities arise out of the complementarity of different network 
pieces. The value of a good increases as more of the complementary good is provided (sold), 
and vice versa. Sales will be initially delayed or blocked by consumers’ awareness of the thin 
network of service stations offering natural gas. The feature of this market is that cars with 
different engines may use the same network, however only a few petrol stations are equipped 
with natural gas pump posts, a fact that reduces the willingness to purchase such a natural gas 
driven motor vehicle.    
The interest in a new kind of fuel for cars or in a new technology (fuel cells) arises 
from the concern about global warming and the scarcity of fossil fuel. CO2 emissions could be 
(partly drastically) reduced by gas-driven cars (natural gas, methane, compressed natural gas 
(CNG)), by hydrogen powered cars or by a fuel-cell engine system. The fuel-cells are the 
technology for the distant future. They convert natural gas, methanol or hydrogen fuel into 
electricity without combustion. When the fuel is hydrogen, then water vapour is the only by-
product from the fuel cell itself.2 Whenever natural gas or methanol is consumed as a fuel, 
                                                 
1  I am grateful to Jörg Gutsche and Peter Hasfeld for very helpful comments.  
2 But one must consider how the hydrogen gets produced. If it is produced from natural gas (as most hydrogen 
is) then carbon dioxide is released to the atmosphere in the production of the hydrogen. 
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CO2 is released. It will take about eight years before fuel-cell powered cars are available 
commercially, and maybe another eight years before they become affordable due to mass 
production. The true time period will depend, however, on the consumption externality in 
terms of the network of service and filling stations. Hydrogen powered cars are even more 
environmentally friendly than gas powered cars, but driving with hydrogen is more expensive 
than with gasoline, given the current price of gasoline. Whereas a gasoline powered car emits 
160 gr. CO2 per km, a hydrogen driven car would emit only 35 gr. CO2 per km if hydrogen is 
produced from a non-exhaustible resource.3 It is filled as a liquid at a temperature of –253° C 
in a special tank. Similarly to the gas powered engine, it is not the technique that is the 
problem, but it is the network. This problem can be diminished by producing bi-fuel cars 
which are based on a combustion engine powered by gasoline as well as by natural gas or 
hydrogen. The disadvantage of these cars is the reduction of space for the backseats and the 
trunk, which is needed for the two tank fillings.  
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between an incumbent firm 
and an entrant with respect to network compatibility and pricing decisions. For this purpose 
we consider a duopoly where firm H has developed a car with a hydrogen power driven 
engine which it wants to introduce into the market. There is already an incumbent, firm G, 
supplying cars with the familiar gasoline driven engine. The non-compatibility of filling 
stations to the new technology is of disadvantage to firm H, called the entrant, since it gives 
owners of gasoline powered cars large network benefits but none for the potential owner of a 
car with the new technology (lock-in effect). The two competing firms have chosen already 
simultaneously and independently from each other their technology, that is their locations at 
either end on the unit interval in a horizontal product differentiation dimension. We model a 
repeated two stage game where in a first stage firm H invests in the network while firm G 
does not need to invest into the existing network as it already is compatible. In a second stage 
both firms compete in prices. The firms repeat this game every five years when consumers 
replace their cars by a new model. In this dynamic setting the prices are the control variables 
and the size of the network is the stock variable. Support for the entrant comes from 
environmental concern of the consumers and from rising gasoline prices. We are interested to 
see whether the entrant can overcome the look-in effect and can conquer market shares.  
In order to relate our findings to the existing literature, we should point out that there 
are two types of product differentiation – horizontal product differentiation within the same 
quality group and vertical product differentiation in terms of different quality levels. 
                                                 
3  CO2 emissions from the construction of a plant is included in the figure. 
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Horizontal product differentiation emphasizes the fact that the supply of a product variant 
(within this quality group) does not satisfy completely some or many consumers. It could 
therefore be a profit maximizing strategy to offer modifications of a standard product which is 
closer to the preferences of some customers. Under vertical product differentiation firms 
choose a high or low quality class in the product space. There is a price-quality competition 
with a trade-off in higher prices for better quality or a lower price for the lower quality. In 
either of these product differentiation models the firms will choose distinct characteristics or 
qualities because as those become close, price competition between the increasingly similar 
products reduces the firms’ profit. In vertical product differentiation models with 
environmental background, the focus of environmental policy is often on minimum quality 
standards (see, e.g. Crampes and Hollander, 1995; Ronnen, 1991; Motta and Thisse (1999)). 
Greaker (2003) presents a partial trade model with one domestic and one foreign firm where 
products are differentiated along both environmental quality (vertical differentiation) and 
taste/eco-label (horizontal differentiation). He focuses on horizontal differentiation by 
assuming that the taste parameter is relatively more important for the consumer than the 
environmental performance of the product. In his model, as in our approach, the two firms are 
located at each end of the 0 1−  product line. We follow Greaker by also assuming that 
horizontal differentiation (environmental concern) dominates vertical differentiation (horse 
power).  
There is a substantial amount of literature on network externalities.4 Katz and Shapiro 
(1985) consider a model of static oligopolistic competition with network externalities. 
Consumers form exogenous expectations on the network size of the competing firms on the 
market (as they will do in our model). Then firms determine their prices on which consumers 
base their purchase decision. Farrell and Saloner (1986) analyze the incentives for adopting a 
new technology that is incompatible with the installed base. In an equilibrium the outcome 
depends on the size of the installed base when the new technology is introduced, it depends on 
how quickly the network benefits of the new technology are realized, and on the relative 
superiority of the new technology. Our results conform with their results although we use a 
different model. 
Papers focusing also on compatibility decisions of oligopolistic firms where network 
externality interact with other quality dimensions, which the firms can control, are 
                                                 
4 See for example Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986, 1992, 1994), and Farrell and Saloner (1985, 1986), and 
especially the book by Shy (2001) devoted to this topic. These authors do not use, however, the models of 
horizontal or vertical product differentiation. Surveys of the literature on the network externalities and market 
performance are found in Katz and Shapiro (1994); Besen and Farrell (1994); Economides (1996); Matutes and 
Régibeau (1996). 
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Belleflamme (1998), Bental and Spiegel (1995), de Palma and Leruth (1996) and Baake and 
Boom (2001). In Belleflamme (1998) a two stage game is analyzed where the firms choose 
first to adopt one of two network technologies. Once firms have adopted one or the other 
technology, they compete on the market with a marginal cost that depends on the size of the 
network to which they belong. Bental and Spiegel consider a model in which the quality of a 
good is identified by the number of consumers who consume that good. Using the preference 
specification of vertical quality differentiation, it is shown that the largest network produced 
will be the most expensive one and used by the richest consumers. De Palma and Leruth study 
the endogenous decision of firms to agree to the same standard. Standardization is the result 
of a two-stage game: at the first stage, firms play in compatibility and at the second stage, 
they play in quantity. Baake and Boom focus on compatibility decisions of two firms where 
network externalities interact with other quality dimensions which the firms can control. 
Network size is not the only vertical dimension but consumers’ willingness to pay increases in 
both the product’s inherent quality and the size of the network. The example, given in the 
paper for network externality and incompatibility are personal computers with different 
qualities using the same operating system and having the same network externality from 
sharing the same pool of available software products. Compatibility can be achieved by an 
adapter. With an adapter, the network size comprises the consumers of both products. The 
endogenous adapter decision is similar to our network of gasoline stations where after their 
remodeling (adapter) the network can be used by both engines. 
Another strand of the literature on network economics utilizes an approach sometimes 
referred to as the supporting services approach. Software packages, for example, are regarded 
as supporting services for the hardware. The literature utilizing the supporting services 
approach includes Chou and Shy (1990, 1993) and Church and Gandal (1992 a, b, 1993 and 
1996). Like in our car engine case, in many instances supporting services are incompatible 
across brands. Since a hydrogen powered car must be gas station compatible, we can not 
utilize these models for our case because they compare equilibrium profits and welfare under 
compatibility and incompatibility.   
Finally, a model similar in spirit is Grilo, Shy and Thisse (2001). They examine a 
model of horizontal product differentiation that introduces a consumption externality. Unlike 
the present paper, Grilo et al. exploit a quadratic externality function. This allows them to 
consider both positive and negative consumption externalities. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model of two firms 
competing for customers when network effects are present and the entrant has to invest in 
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achieving compatibility to the existing network. Section 3 presents the dynamic structure of 
the game and section 4 characterizes a steady state situation where the entrant has no 
incentive anymore to invest in compatibility. Some or all petrol stations have been remodeled 
and cars can refuel either gasoline or hydrogen at those stations. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Network effect and compatibility 
We consider a market with an incumbent and a potential entrant or “sponsor”5 where 
competition is in market shares using price and investment in compatibility as instruments. 
The incumbent benefits from the existing network and from the lock-in effect for the owner of 
gasoline cars which generates external effects. Decisions from the past favor the established 
technology although a new technology would lead to a socially preferable equilibrium. In the 
first stage of our non-cooperative repeated game the incumbent trusts on the lock-in effect and 
on his well-extended network whereas the sponsor has to invest in compatibility to remodel 
the gas-stations. Since this increases the entrant’s cost, he needs support for his costly 
investment by environmental concern in the society and by a steadily raising gasoline price. In 
the second stage of the game firms compete in prices taking into account the size of their 
installed base. Our model differs from standard models of horizontal product differentiation 
because of the introduction of a network externality (lock-in) and because of the aspect that 
the complementary good (gasoline) for the product of the incumbent will be exhausted in the 
near future. Compatibility of the new product with the installed base of the incumbent is not a 
meaningful strategy for the producer of an engine as it is for a PC producer offering IBM 
compatible PCs which can use the standard software.6 In our model the entrant has to invest 
money in remodeling the existing network to make it compatible to hydrogen powered cars.7  
In our model of horizontal product differentiation each consumer buys one unit of the 
product every five years. There is a continuum of consumers uniformly distributed over 
                                                 
5  Katz and Shapiro (1986) call a firm a sponsor of a technology if it controls the property rights to a given 
technology. In that case the firm will be willing to invest into the network or in the form of penetration pricing to 
establish the technology because then there is the prospect of profits in later periods.    
6  See Pfähler and Wiese (1998) for a game in the degrees of compatibility. For a survey on compatibility and 
network effects see Wiese (1997).  
7 Since by assumption firms offer characteristics at each end of the 0-1 product line, we therefore exclude the 
strategy to produce cars with bi-fuel engines, having two tanks. This strategy, observable in reality, is a way to 
become compatible with the installed base. It would eliminate the advantage of the installed base for the 
incumbent but raises the cost of production and in addition reduces the capacity of the trunk compartment. 
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Hotelling’s [0,1] interval. The net-utility of consumer [ ]0,1θ ∈ , who buys a unit of good G 
(gasoline powered car) in period t, indexed in five-year intervals, is:8 
 
(1)   ( ) 2G G G G Gv u p n qθ τ θ γ α= − ⋅ − + − . 
 
The net-utility of consumer [ ]0,1θ ∈ , who buys a unit of good H (hydrogen powered car) in 
period t is: 
 
(2)   ( ) ( )21H H H H Hv u p n qθ τ θ γ α= − − − + − . 
 
Good G are cars driven by gasoline and good H are cars driven by hydrogen power or by fuel-
cells. By assumption, firm G produces at zero on the 0–1 Hotelling line, and firm H at one. 
The locations are fixed, i.e. the firms produce either gasoline powered cars or hydrogen 
powered cars (no bi-fuel engine). The meaning of the variables is:  
 
u   - intrinsic utility 
2τ θ⋅   - transportation costs, i.e. costs for not getting the preferred characteristics 
in   - size of network i,    ,i G H=      
γ   - weight of the size of the network for a monetary network effect inγ  
Gq   - current gasoline price 
Hq   - price for hydrogen fuel (backstop technology) 
,G Hα α  - consumption coefficients, expressing quantity aspects and environmental 
     concern ( )G Hα α>  
 
Horizontal product differentiation in our car model means that if both firms charge the same 
price, demand for both goods is positive if there are no overwhelming differences in terms of 
environmental concern and network effects. Some motorists prefer the established, matured 
technology, the high horse power and the driving dynamics while others favor the new 
technology because of the stillness in running, the low noise gauge of the engine, the jerk-free 
                                                 
8  We consider only those consumers who buy a car every five years. This is the target group for the automobile 
producers. We assume that owners of cars older than five years will buy used cars older than five years when 
replacing their cars. 
 8
start and the more comfortable stop and go driving, and its excellent environmental 
performance. There is no difference in quality, i.e. we do not consider aspects of vertical 
product differentiation. The main characteristic of the consumer, described by [ ]0,1θ ∈  is 
environmental concern, which is the reason for the different willingness to pay. Some 
consumers consider gasoline powered cars as environmentally unfriendly, while others do not 
care about an environmentally friendly technology like fuel cells. The difference of the net-
utilities in (1) and (2) shows the possibilities, firms have to attract customers: 
 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 2 1 2G H H G G H H H G G
difference in utility price effect fuel price and environmentalproduct differentiation network effect
concern
v v p p n n q qθ θ τ θ γ α α− = − + − + − + −  
 
Favorable for the incumbent is (i) a higher price of the entrant, (ii) its product differentiation 
in terms of attracting consumers to the left of 1 2  on the [0,1] line, (iii) a larger network effect 
and (iv) a relatively high price for hydrogen and a relatively low environmental concern 
( Hα relative to Gα ).9 
Next, we define the size of the network in its general form in terms of a share as:   
 
(3)  ( ) je eii i i i j
G H G H
IBIBn s IB
IB IB IB IB
θ θ⎛ ⎞= + + +⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠  
                            direct           indirect          compatibility 
 
where eiθ  is the expected market share of cars of type i, iIB  is the installed base and ( )i is IB  
is the degree of compatibility of network j i≠  for network i. The larger is , the more enforces 
the network size of firm j the network size of firm i. GIB  are the gas stations with gasoline 
pumps only, HIB  are the remodeled gasoline stations, i.e. those with pumps for gasoline as 
well as for hydrogen (natural gas, etc.). The sum of the gas stations, G HSIB IB IB= + , is 
constant, i.e. new gas stations will not be built, only existing gas stations GIB  will be 
remodeled to become compatible. The network effect can be characterized as direct, if the 
customers are interested that other consumers purchase or use the same good. A network 
                                                 
9  Horizontal product differentiation implies that the difference in utility should be negative for consumer θ  
close to 1 and positive for consumer θ  close to zero if H Gp p= . This property requires 
( )G H H H G Gn n q qγ α α τ− + − < .   
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effect is called indirect, if a complementary good becomes better and/or cheaper to the extent 
the network good diffuses. A network good can fail because there are no – or not enough 
complementary goods on the market.   
We will simplify (3) by first neglecting the direct effect, i.e. the expected market share  
of cars. Consumers will not expect a better network for H-cars because they see more H-cars 
on the road, i.e. 0, ,ei i G Hθ = = . Since firm G does not need any gas stations that have been 
remodeled to also sell hydrogen, the degree of compatibility of the H-stations for its network 
equals one, i.e. ( ) 1G Gs IB = . From the point of view of firm G the total network SIB is 
compatible for gasoline cars, that is, the entire installed base contributes to firm G’s network 
size, regardless whether the gas stations sell gasoline only or gasoline as well as hydrogen. 
Therefore, (3) simplifies to 1Gn = . For firm H, the portion of the installed base in the network 
size in (3) is the portion of gas stations remodeled in the past to also sell hydrogen. (2. term in 
(3)). Firm H invests in the installed base HIB  in order to increase the compatibility of gas 
stations with hydrogen; i.e. ( ) 0H Hs IB >  and 0Hs′ > . A higher Hs  means that a higher 
portion of former non-compatible G-stations can now be made compatible. Therefore, if we 
normalize SIB to one for convenience, (3) will become:  
 
(4)  ( )H H H H Gn IB s IB IB= + ⋅ . 
 
If 1Hs = , then follows 1Hn =  analogously to 1Gn = .10 A specification for ( )H Hs IB  could be 
( )H H Hs IB IB=  or ( ) ( ) 21H H H Hs IB a IB a IB= ⋅ + − . In both cases is 0Hs =  for 0HIB =  and 
1Hs =  for 1HIB SIB= = . A degree of compatibility of 1Hs =  means that all former G-
stations ( ( )0GIB  at the beginning) have been remodeled as G H+  stations.        
We are interested in finding a consumer [0,1]θ ∈  who is indifferent at prices ,G Hp p  to 
purchase from firm G (to the left of θ ) or from firm H (to the right of θ ). From 
( ) ( )1G Hv vθ θ= − , we can solve for θ . It is  
 
(5) ( )1
2
H G H H G G G H Hp p IB s IB q qτ γ α αθ τ
+ − − − + + − +=? . 
                                                 
10 One should consider that the number of GIB s′ , the gas stations not yet remodeled, declines over time when 
HIB  increases. If all GIB s′  have been remodeled, it is 0GIB =  and H Hn IB= .  
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Since all consumers θ  with θ θ< ?  buy good G, the demand function of firm G is 
( ), , , , ,G G H G H G Hx p p IB IB q q θ= ? . Because of 1G Hx x+ = , the demand function of firm H is   
 
(6)  
( )
( )
, , , , ,
1
1
2
H G H G H G H
G H H H G G G H H
x p p IB IB q q
p p IB s IB q qτ γ α αθ τ
+ − + − + + + −= − =?  
 
Firm G maximizes profit with respect to price: 
 
( ) ( )max , , , , ,
G
G G G G G H G H G Hp
p c x p p IB IB q qπ = − ⋅ . 
 
Since firm G does not need to invest in compatibility, its maximization problem is not an 
intertemporal one but is the same in each period, given price Hp  and its installed base SIB. 
Firm H maximizes profit with respect to price and to investment in compatibility: 
 
   ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
,
0
max , , , , ,
H H
T
rt
H H H H G H G H G H Hp I
e p c x p p IB IB q q C I dtπ −= − ⋅ −∫  
 
s.t.          H HIB I=?      with    1G HIB IB= −    and r as the discount rate. We assume that the 
remodeling department operates under decreasing returns to scale.11 This is a realistic 
assumption because firm H needs special equipment and specially trained workers which it 
can not use anymore after remodeling is finished.  
Next we simplify (5) and (6) by defining: 
(7)  : 1IB H H Gn IB s IB∆ = − −  
 
(8)  ( ): H H G Gq qq α αγ
−∆ = . 
 
Then the market shares are12:  
                                                 
11  If e.g. ( ) 2H HC I Iδ= , this implies that marginal investment costs increases with the number of investment 
projects, HI , of remodeling existing gasoline stations. 
12  See Pfähler and Wiese (1998) for a model with network effects, installed bases and competition in prices and 
degrees of compatibilities (Chapter L). 
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(5’)  ( )1 12 2 IBG H Gx p p n qγτ ⎡ ⎤= + − + ∆ + ∆⎣ ⎦  
 
(6’)  ( )1 12 2 IBH H Gx p p n qγτ ⎡ ⎤= − − + ∆ + ∆⎣ ⎦ .  
 
The firm has a “natural share of customers” of 1 2 . It consists of the customers 1 2θ ≤  which 
purchase from firm G because it is closer to their preferences. If prices are identical and there 
is no network effect, then demand is equal to this natural share of customers. If G Hp p< , then 
more customers purchase good G not because of the nearness to their preferences but because 
of the favorable price.  
Under profit maximization, the FOCs with respect to Gp  and Hp  lead to a Nash 
equilibrium of the simultaneous price competition in every period t. 
   
(9)  ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2 33N IBG H Gp t c c n t q tτ γ⎡ ⎤= + + + ∆ + ∆⎣ ⎦  
 
(10)  ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2 33N IBH G Hp t c c n t q tτ γ⎡ ⎤= + + − ∆ + ∆⎣ ⎦ . 
 
Inserting (9) and (10) in (5’) and (6’) results in the market shares ( ), ,NG H H Gx IB q q  and 
1 N NG Hx x− = : 
 
(11)  ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 12 6N IBG H Gx t c c n t q tγτ ⎡ ⎤= + − + ∆ + ∆⎣ ⎦  
(12)  ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 12 6N IBH H Gx t c c n t q tγτ ⎡ ⎤= − − + ∆ + ∆⎣ ⎦ . 
 
There is a sequence of Nash equilibriums over time which firm H can influence in its 
favor by investing in compatibility, ( )HI t , to raise its installed base, ( )HIB t . Firm G, 
however, need not by definition invest in its network. The main motivation for the sponsor is 
its perfect information on the increasing price path ( )Gp t  of gasoline. We assume that it 
increases over time according to the Hotelling price rule of a resource, i.e. (0) rtGq e  where r is 
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the discount rate. It means that for a firm to be indifferent between extracting the resource in 
the current period and a future period, the price must rise at the discount rate. An optimal 
exploitation path for crude oil is based on this Hotelling price rule. If the oil resource is 
exhausted in T, ( )Gq T  must be equal to the price of the backstop-technology hydrogen, i.e. 
( ) ( )0 rTH G Gq q e q T= = , and no consumer buys from firm G anymore.  
 Profit for firm H is: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ), , ,N NH H H H H H H HI IB q p IB t q t c x t C I tπ ⎡ ⎤∆ = ∆ − ⋅ −⎣ ⎦  
 
where ( )GIB t  has been replaced by ( ) ( )1G HIB t IB t= − . With a fixed price of the backstop 
technology, Hq , the difference in the cost aspect of the complementary good declines in time 
according to (8), i.e. ( ) ( )( )0 rtH H G Gq t q q eγ α α⋅∆ = − . The intertemporal problem of firm H 
is then to control the outcome on the path of Nash equilibria by choosing an optimal 
investment path ( )IH t : 
 
(13)  ( )
0
max , ,
H
T
rt
H H HI
e I IB q dtπ− ∆∫   
 
  s.t. H HIB I=? .  
 The Hamilton function for (13) is 
 
 ( )H HH Iπ µ= + ⋅ . 
 
The maximum principle yields 
 
(13a)  0
H
H
I
H
H
I
π µ∂= + =∂ . 
 
The portfolio balance condition for µ  is: 
 
(13b)  
H HIB IB
r H rµ µ µ π= − = −? . 
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HI  is the control variable, HIB  the state variable and µ  is the co-state variable or shadow 
value of the installed base.  
 At time T, the gas price ( ) (0) rTG Gq T q e=  has reached the price of the backstop 
technology Hq  and the oil field is exhausted. In that case, Gx  should be zero and there are 
only cars run by hydrogen; investment in HIB  should be finished by then. For such a steady 
state in T it is 0HIB =? , i.e. ( ) 0HI T = , and 0µ =? , i.e. 1( ) HIBT rµ π= . Prior to T, the time path 
of the solutions ( )HI t  and ( )HIB t  are functions of Hq  and ( )Gq t ,  
 
(14)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ( ) , , ( )H H H G H H H GI t I q q t IB t IB q q t= = . 
 
The firms need to know the values of Hq , ( )0Gq  and T. The price Hq  of the backstop 
technology is defined such that the market share of the old technology is zero when the price 
of its complementary good gasoline, ( )Gq T , reaches Hq , i.e. ( )( ), 0 0rTG H Gx q q e = . That 
means that firm H must know the price path of gasoline, ( )Gq t .  Under complete information, 
however, it knows the strategy of the oil industry, which, under profit maximizing behavior, 
will have exploited its oil field exactly then, when the market share for cars run by gas has 
reached zero. That means that at time T, the oil price must have reached the level Hq , 
meaning the highest possible price when the oil field is exploited afterwards. Therefore, 
( )Gq T  at 0Gx =  must be equal to the price of the backstop technology, 
 
(15)  ( ) ( )0 rTH G Gq q e q T= = . 
 
Once we have derived ( )Gq T  from the condition ( )( ), 0 0rTG H Gx q q e = , assuming 
( )G Hq T q= , its solution ( )( ) , , ,G H G H Gq T q c c α α=  defines by (15) the price of the backstop 
technology.  
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3. The dynamic structure of the game 
We will postpone the explicit solution of the optimization problem and will at first clarify the 
dynamic structure of the game. In every period there is a compatibility decision by means of 
HI , where we have assumed that firm G need not to invest in compatibility, because the 
sponsor (firm H) has to remodel the existing installed base which is compatible for gasoline 
powered cars anyhow. Knowing the Nash price equilibria, depending on HIH  and HIB , firm    
H can determine an optimal path for its compatibility decision. Before we prove our results, 
we characterize in Table 1 three points in time with their corresponding values of the 
variables. Depending on the price of the backstop technology, a steady state could be reached 
at a time *T , prior to T, with all gasoline stations remodeled13 and the firms share the market. 
The middle part of Table 1 characterizes this situation. After a while (at T), the gasoline price 
has reached the price of the backstop technology and environmentally friendly hydrogen 
powered cars become more attractive to the consumers. This outcome is characterizes in the 
lower part of Table 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13  We will prove in the next section, that in a steady state 0GIB = , i.e. there are no gas-stations anymore which 
serve only gasoline. 
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*<t T : firm H invests in compatibility 
 
( ) 0GIB t >  : 1Gs =    0GI =    ( )Gp t   0Gπ >  
( ) 0HIB t >  : ( ) 0H Hs IB >   ( ) 0HI t >   ( )Hp t   ?Hπ  
( )G Hq t q<                                                              ( ) 0Gx t > ,       ( ) 0Hx t >  
                                                     ( )( )1H Hs IB t +      ( )1HIB t +?                   
*=t T : full compatibility; both firms share the market 
*( ) 0GIB T =  : 1Gs =    0GI =    *( )G Gp T c>  0Gπ >  
*( ) 1HIB T SIB= =  ( ) 1Hs SIB =   *( ) 0HI T =   *( )H Hp T c>  0Hπ >  
*( )G Hq T q<                                                                 *( ) 0Gx T > ,         *( ) 0Hx T >  
*= >t T T : oil price reaches the price qH; market exit of firm G 
( ) 0GIB T =  : 1Gs =    0GI =    ( )G Gp T c=  0Gπ =  
( ) 1HIB T SIB= =  ( ) 1Hs SIB =   ( ) 0HI T =   ( )H Hp T c>  0Hπ >  
( )G Hq T q=         ( ) 0Gx T = ,  ( ) 1Hx T =  
Table 1:  Steady state periods with crude oil ( )T  and without ( )*T .   
 
We continue by examining the point in time T where the oil resource is exhausted. For that 
purpose we need a resource constraint, a price of gasoline (0) rTGq e  where 0Gx = , and the 
Hotelling path satisfying ( )0 rTH Gq q e= . These three conditions permit us to determine 
, HT q , and ( )0Gq . If a steady state occurs in T, it is ( ) 0HI T =  and therefore ( ) 0HC I = . For 
the installed base we assume that in T: 0GIB =  (The proof will follow later). Then 0IBn∆ =  
in (7). For q∆  follows according to (8): 
 
(16)   ( )H GHq q α αγ
−∆ = . 
 
Using these results we obtain from (11) with 0NGx =   
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(17)  ( )3(0) H GrTG
G H
c c
q e
τ
α α
+ −= − . 
 
We assume that G Hα α> , i.e. if prices Hq  and rTGq e  are equal, the Gα -effect of cars run by 
gasoline has a stronger negative effect on utility iv  in (1) and (2) than the environmentally 
friendly Hα -effect. This is how we consider the negative externality of fossil fuels in the 
utility function. If τ  in (17) is high (strong preferences for the good at either end of the 
product line), the demand for cars run by gasoline will be zero only when the gasoline 
price has reached a high level ( )Gq T . If G Hα α−  is high (strong negative externality of 
cars run by gasoline), the demand for gasoline cars will be zero already when the 
gasoline price has reached a relatively low level ( )Gq T . Condition (17) can be used to 
solve for (0)Gq  as a function of T. Now only a value for T is needed. This value can be 
determined from the finiteness of the resource crude oil given the value of ( )0Gq , i.e.  
 
(18)  ( ) 0
0
( ), (0)
T
rt
G H Gx IB t q e dt Sρ ⋅ =∫  
 
where 0S  is the initial oil stock and ρ  is a coefficient which transforms the portion of 
cars run by gasoline into gasoline consumption. Here we must bear in mind that (17) 
and (18) form a simultaneous system for the determination of T and ( )0Gq . Figure 1 
clarifies our considerations. The shaded area represents the initial stock of oil. It is 
exactly exhausted at the same time (T) when the price of oil reaches the price of the 
industrial substitute. 
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Fig. 1: Market share Gx  of firm G and oil extraction Gxρ ⋅  until the gasoline price Gq  
approaches the price of the backstop technology, Hq . 
 
 
4. Analysis of the steady state 
The open questions we haven’t answered yet are (i) whether the sponsor will invest in 
compatibility ( )( ) 0HI t >  although he will bear a loss in the first periods, and (ii) 
whether he will invest until full compatibility is reached ( )HIB SIB= , i.e. all gas 
stations provide hydrogen. For that purpose we first write the profit function in the 
variables , ,H HI IB q∆  by using the prices and market shares in (9) to (12): 
  
(19)  ( ) ( ) 21 318 IBG G Hc c n qπ τ γτ ⎡ ⎤= − − + ∆ + ∆⎣ ⎦  
 
(20)  ( ) ( ) ( )21 318 IBH G H Hc c n q C Iπ τ γτ ⎡ ⎤= + − − ∆ + ∆ −⎣ ⎦ . 
It is 
(21)   ( ) 0H H
H
C I
I
π∂ ′= − <∂ ,  
(0)Gq
1 
Time t 
 
 
( )Gq t
Gxρ ⋅
Hq
D 
Gx  
T
0S
slope ρ  
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i.e. in each particular period remodeling HI  gas stations reduces profit. The positive 
effect will come later once the compatibility is established. The maximizing principle 
postulates according to (13a): 
 
(13a)  0H
H H
H
I I
π µ∂∂ = + =∂ ∂ . 
 
As the installed base changes by H HIB I=? , it is ( ) 0HI T =  in the steady state (period 
T ).  With ( ) 0HC I′ =  at ( ) 0HI T = ,14 it is ( ) 0H
H
T
I
π∂ =∂  (see (20)); therefore ( ) 0Tµ =  
from (13a). Hence (see (13b)), we have to solve the equation 0HIB
HIB
π∂ =∂  in order to 
determine ( )HIB T . According to (20) and (7) we obtain 
 
(22)  [ ] ( )( )1 2 1 0
18
H
H G H
H
s IB s
IB
π γτ
∂ ′= ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ − − + =∂  
 
where  1G HIB IB= −  accounts for the last term. As [ ] 0⋅ ≠ , which is the term in 
brackets in (20), the FOC for HIB  is 
 
  ( )1 0H G Hs IB s′− − ⋅ + = . 
 
With our assumption of ( )H H Hs IB IB= , the FOC is: 
 
  1 0G HIB IB− − + = . 
 
Since 1G HIB IB= − , we obtain * 1HIB = , i.e. ( )* 1H Hs IB =  and * 1HIB SIB= = . All gas stations 
in the steady state provide gasoline as well as natural gas, and firm H has invested in the
                                                 
14 e.g. ( ) 2H HC I Iδ= ⋅ . 
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network of gasoline stations to achieve full compatibility.15 
In Table 1 we distinguished two periods of a steady state. We had assumed a time 
period *T  where a steady state is reached but the path of the gasoline price is still below Hq ; 
i.e. ( )0 rtH Gq q e>  for *t T≥ . In period *T T> , we assumed that ( )0 rTH Gq q e=  and oil is 
exhausted. This then implies a steady state with 0Gx =  and permits to solve for ( )0q ,T  and 
Hq . Figure 2 shows the situation where a steady state is reached but the exploited stock of oil 
*S  is still below the proven reserves 0S . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: A steady state is reached (full compatibility) before the stock of proven oil reserves is 
exhausted.  
In the steady state with oil still available ( * ( ) 0HI t = , * ( ) 1HIB t = , * ( ) 0GIB t =  and  
0IBn∆ =  for    )*T t T≤ < , the market shares follow from (11) and (12) 
 
         [ ]* 1 1( ) ( )
2 6G H G H H G G
x t c c q q tα ατ= + − + − , 
 
                                                 
15 If we had employed the specification ( )( )2( ) 1H H H Hs IB a IB a IB= + − , the result for *Hs  would also have 
been * 1Hs =  with * 1HIB = . 
 
*T
*
Gx  
(0)Gx
(0)Gq
1 
Time t 
 
Gq
Hq
Gx  
( )Gq t
Gxρ ⋅
*
0S S<
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[ ]* 1 1( ) ( )
2 6H H G H H G G
x t c c q q tα ατ= − − + −       for      
*T t T≤ < . 
 
( )*Gx t  declines in ( )Gq t  and hence * ( )Hx t  increases in ( )Gq t  until t T= . Prices are 
 
          ( ) ( )* 1 2 3 ( )
3G H G H H G G
p t c c q q tτ α α= + + + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ,  
 
          ( ) ( )* 1 2 3 ( )
3H G H H H G G
p t c c q q tτ α α= + + − +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦     for       *T t T≤ < . 
 
* ( )Gp t  declines in ( )Gq t  and 
* ( )Hp t  increases in ( )Gq t  until t T=  is reached. Profits are 
 
( ) 2* 1( ) 3 ( )
18G H H G G
t q q tπ τ α ατ= + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
  
  ( ) 2* 1( ) 3 ( )
18H H H G G
t q q tπ τ α ατ= − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦   
 
with * ( )G tπ  declining in ( )Gq t  and * ( )H tπ  increasing in ( )Gq t  for  *T t T≤ < . 
In ( )*T T≥  we assume that the gasoline price has reached the price of the backstop 
technology, i.e. ( )0 rTH Gq q e= . For a backstop technology, the demand for the former 
substitute is zero ( * 0Gx = ), hence ( )Gq T  as in (17). The prices are 
 
 G Gp c=    ,          2H Hp c τ= +   
 
and profits are 
 0Gπ = ,          2Hπ τ= .  
 
T follows from (18), i.e. 
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( ) ( )
*
*
0
0
T T
G G
T
x t dt x t dt Sρ ρ+ =∫ ∫ 16 
 
With ( )( )0GT q  as solution from this resource availability restriction, we obtain ( )0Gq  from 
(17). 
We finally can do a phase diagram analysis in order to evaluate the slopes of the 
equations of motion near the steady state. For that purpose we choose HI?  and HIB?  as our two 
equations of motion.17 The dynamics of HIB  and HI  around the steady state is presented in 
Figure 3. 
 
 
 
As shown in Fig. 3, the control variable HI  is used to guide HIB  from (0) 0HIB =  to * 1HIB =  
(solved for) in an optimal way. 
 
                                                 
16  With ( )Gx t  from (11) we obtain 
( ) ( )( ) ( )*
*
0
0
1 1 1
2 6 2 6
T T
IB
H G H G
T
c c n t q t dt c c q t dt Sγρ γ ρ γτ τ
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤+ − + ∆ + ∆ + + − + ∆ =⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⋅ ⋅⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫ .  
Using ( )* 0IBn T∆ =  for *T T>  and by integrating some parts, the condition is 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
* **
* 0
0 0
1 1 0
2 6 6 6
T T
IB G
H G H H H G
ST c c dt n t dt q T q q
r
αγ ατ τ τ ρ
⎡ ⎤+ − + ∆ + − − =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫ . 
 
17  For details see the Appendix. 
+ 
 
-
* 1HIB =
HIB
0HI =?  
0HIB =?  
E
+ 
 + 
- 
 - 
+ 
 + 
- 
 - 
+ + + + + 
 - - - - - 
* 0HI =  
HI  
                Fig. 3: The dynamics towards the steady state E. 
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5. Conclusion 
Our model has shown that there need not be a market failure if a new technology lacks a 
network. First, we have shown that although profit Hπ  of the entrant will decline in HI  in 
each period, Hπ  will at the same time increase in HIB  in each period. If the network effect 
γ is strong enough, then even in the short run the positive effect from 0H
HIB
π∂ >∂  contributes 
more to profit than the negative effect from 0H
HI
π∂ <∂  reduces profit (for a proof, the 
difference between the two partial derivatives has to be calculated). Second, our model has 
pointed out the crucial role of the price path of gasoline, of environmental concern ( G Hα α> ) 
and of the price of the backstop technology on network size and price competition. Especially 
the price path of gasoline forces the incumbent to lower its price Gp  and permits the entrant 
at the same time to raise his price. Nevertheless, the incumbent will lose market shares and 
the entrant will benefit from that. However, in case unit production costs Hc  including costs 
of remodeling existing gasoline stations ( )( )HC I  are high compared to the production costs 
Gc  of the incumbent, then the entrant might bear a loss over several periods until the 
Hotelling price path of oil might help him to make positive profit after some years (note that 
in (20) 0q∆ >  decline in t). If the costs of remodeling the installed base GIB  are high, then 
there will be market failure in spite of the Hotelling price path for gasoline. Market failure can 
occur if in the first period (1) 0Hπ < , that is, the sponsor makes a loss. In case it makes a 
profit in later periods, loss in the beginning is not a problem. However, if the loss is rather 
high and the firm cannot get a loan from the banks, then the new technology will not be 
introduced. According to Hπ  (1) from (20), firm H will make a loss in the first period18 if (i) 
the investment costs for achieving compatibility are high, (ii) the network effect IBnγ ⋅∆  is 
high, (iii) unit cost Hc  are much higher than Gc , or (iv) the price of hydrogen is relatively 
high ( q∆  is large). In such a case the government could pay a subsidy such that (1) 0Hπ =  in 
the first period. As q∆  declines in t and IBn∆  declines in HI , the loss situation improves 
from period to period. If there is no subsidy program, cooperative policy between the car 
producers, the energy companies and the government is required to prevent a situation where 
the society runs out of oil and huge investment costs emerge all of a sudden to remodel 
                                                 
18  That is if ( ) ( ) ( )3 (1) (1) 3 (1) 2IBG H Hc c n q C Iτ γ τ+ − − ∆ + ∆ < ⋅ . 
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gasoline stations as well as automobile engines. In view of the exhaustion of crude oil within 
the next decades, the investment in compatibility of existing gasoline stations should be a 
profit maximizing strategy for the motor vehicle industry.   
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Appendix: 
The Phase Diagram Analysis 
 
From Hπ  in (20), (13a) becomes 
 
  '( ) 0HC I µ− + =     
or 
  ( ) 0H HC I I µ′′− + =? ? . 
 
With µ?  from (13b) we obtain  
  
  ( ) ( ) 0HH H H
H
C J I r C I
IB
π∂′′ ′− + − =∂?  
that is 
 
(23)  1 ( )
( )
H
H H
H H
I r C I
C I IB
π⎛ ⎞∂′= −⎜ ⎟′′ ∂⎝ ⎠
?  
 
as one equation of motion. The other one is  
 
(24)   H HIB I=?  
 
To show the motions of HIB  and HI  off the steady state ( )* *,H HIB I , we first determine for the 
steady state ( )0H H H HI d I IB d IB= = = =? ? ? ?  the slope of the 0HI =?  equation and of the 
0HIB =?  equation (the proof of the signs are given after equation (28). 
 
(25)  0HIB =? : 0Hd I =  
 
(26)  0HI =?   0H
H
d I
d IB
<  
 
For the motions off the steady state we obtain for the 0HIB =?  equation 
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(27)  1H
H
IB
I
∂ =∂
?
 ,   0H
H
IB
IB
∂ =∂
?
 
 
and for the 0HI =?  equation 
(28)   H
H
I r
I
∂ =?  ,   0H
H
I
IB
∂ >∂
?
. 
 
 
In order to evaluate the slopes of the two equations of motion (23) and (24) near the steady 
state we differentiate each of them with respect to each of the included variables. For 
example, for the ( , )H H HIB IB I equation,  
 
  H Hd IB d I=?  
 
and for the ( ),H H HI I IB equation, using ( ) 2H HC I Iδ=  , H Hs IB= , and Hπ  in (20) 
 
( )( ) [ ]( )2 2 2
18H H H H
d I r I IB d IBγ δ= + − + ⋅ + ⋅⋅?  
 
with [ ]⋅  as the term in brackets in (20) and ( )⋅  as the terms in parentheses in (22). 
Next we verify the slope of the 0HI =?  equation at the steady state: 
 
(26’)   [ ] 0
9
H
H
d I
d IB
γ
δ= − <⋅                          as [ ] 0>  
and ( ) 0⋅ =  at the steady state. 
In order to verify (27) and (28), the motions off the steady state, we obtain for the 0HIB =?  
equation the partial derivatives given in (27), and for the 0HI =?  equation 
 
(28’)   H
H
I r
I
∂ =∂
?
  ( ) [ ]21
9
H
H
H
d I IB
d IB
γ γ
δ τ
⎛ ⎞= − − + +⎜ ⎟⋅ ⎝ ⎠
?
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which is positive as * 1HIB ≈  in the neighbourhood of the steady state. 
 
